I do not agree with the overall assessment that the new scanning and reporting technique does not change the rules of the game. Scanning data in the cloud is one thing. It hits data in the cloud only and cannot be extended further and fails if those data is protected by let's say encryption. Scanning data on the device is another thing. It possibly hits all data. And there is no protection possible.

The new mechanism is there to support law enforcement. Now, with that new mechanism in place on th device how shall Apple argue if law enforcement asks for other things to do on the device? Like introducing a sniffer into iMessages law enforcement may use to read messages before encryption? There is a high demand by law enforcement all over the world to be able to do this, the so called "free, democratic" world included.

Here in Germany, laws have already been made to allow both law enforcement and intelligence agencies to attack devices abusing unresolved security flaws with the goal to circumvent encryption of communication by reading the cleartext on one end. Asking Apple to deploy a sniffer into iOS to make this possible without abusing zero-day-hacks is a logical demand.